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Review Article 
The New Soviet History 
Daniel T. Orlovsky 
Southern Methodist University 
The fields of late Imperial Russian and Soviet history have reached a new plateau. 
Recent scholarship-particularly in the areas of social history of late Imperial 
Russia, the historiography of the Russian revolutions of1917, and the post-1917 
history of the Soviet Union-has broken ew conceptual ground and, at least in 
the case of post-1917 history, has opened entire new areas of enquiry. These 
developments often have run well ahead of corresponding openings in the current 
Soviet discourse of historians and publicists. There, the tendency has been to 
blame present-day problems and moral failures of the party on Stalin and his 
personal regime and on the "administrative command" system.' It is convenient 
to begin Soviet history in 1928 or 1929 with Stalin's "great change," but it is the 
investigation fthe formative years of Soviet power, which must include the 
revolutionary tradition going back to 1905-7 and 1917 through the end of the 
twenties, that will supply the insight into basic Soviet political and social 
institutions. Only very recently have professional historians inthe USSR begun to 
call for abandoning the hoary official historiography of the October Revolution 
and reassessing the role of Lenin.2 With the events of the past eighteen months in 
Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union, some have already proclaimed "the end of 
history" and have argued that one need not bother explaining how the Soviet 
Union came to be, how its basic social and political institutions (totalitarian or
not) were created, how they developed, and how they launched and nurtured the 
processes that have brought us to the present watershed. Itis as if by labeling the 
period a totalitarian orutopian disaster one is no longer equired to explain its 
sources or how it worked. This is a peculiar form of moral blindness, for it surely 
1 A good summary of the discussion in the Soviet Union and the basically conservative 
approach of the historical profession to the major issues of Soviet history may be found in Mark 
von Hagen, "History and Politics under Gorbachev: Professional Autonomy and Democratiza- 
tion," Harriman Institute Forum 1 (1988): 1-8. See also Aleksandr Nekrich, "Perestroika in 
History: The First Phase," Survey 30, no. 4 (June 1989): 22-43. 
2 See V. Startsev, "Istoriia oktiabria v noveishei literature," Kommunist 15 (1988): 117-21; 
P. Volobuev, "Obrashchaias' k velikomu opytu: sovremennye zadachi i metodologiia izucheniia 
oktiabria," Kommunist 16 (1988): 90- 101. For a particularly bold discussion of the origins of 
Stalinism that places its roots deeply in the period 1917-24 (a view that derives the nature of 
Stalinism from the moral shortcomings of bolshevism as ideology and the early practices and 
policies of the Bolshevik regime under Lenin), see A. Tsypko, "Istoki Stalinizma," Nauka i 
zhizn' (November-December 1988), pp. 40-48. 
[Journal of Modern History 62 (December 1990): 831-850] 
? 1990 by The University of Chicago. 0022-2801/90/6204-0006$01.00 
All rights reserved. 
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will blunt our critical faculties and prevent us from understanding similar 
phenomena wherever they may occur. 
In the West, the field of Soviet history has been marked by two paradigmatic 
shifts, the first from the eclecticism that produced the handful of first-rate 
life-and-times biographies of revolutionary leaders and the basic political histories 
centered around the Communist party to social history broadly conceived 
(embracing what is now called the "new cultural history"), and the second from 
the history of Imperial Russia and the 1917 revolutions to the history of the 
post-1917 Soviet period itself. These shifts have been propelled by new questions 
and the use of new sources, but by no means have changing scholarly fashions 
produced consensus on key historical issues of the revolutionary era (1900- 
1930). Such basic questions as the origins of Bolshevik authoritarianism, the
nature of the Stalin regime, the question of "altematives," the contours of the 
basic social movements of the era and their connection to politics and culture are 
still very hotly debated despite the growing literature that takes revolution 
(conceived of as completed transformation) as its point of departure. There 
remains a problem of perspective, of pinning down degree and kind in speaking 
of the influence of the prerevolutionary past on revolutionary outcomes. The 
problem of continuity-or, to use Lenin's term, "survivals" (perezhitki)-has 
not been solved despite the heroic efforts of historians convinced that revolution- 
ary transformation s to be understood in its own terms. Basic concepts and 
categories, such as state versus society, totalitarianism, Stalinism, and "civil 
society," have been deconstructed, tom down, unmasked, and rebuilt leaving only 
the vaguest sense of closure on the debates. The interested reader faces a growing 
mass of publications (a good number of them outside the ordinary realm of 
academic discourse and more properly categorized either as publitsistika oras 
what used to be known as "unofficial history") and the academic works under 
review here provide clear examples of current s rengths and some weaknesses of 
a very dynamic field. I should emphasize at the outset hat hese academic works 
go far to advance our knowledge and to deepen discussion-farther than some of 
the recent debates carried on in print on the nature of Stalinism, the great error, 
and the like.3 
I. RESTORING THE REVOLUTIONARY T ADrITON 
In the rush to exploit new openings in post-1917 Soviet history, scholars have 
nearly succumbed to the danger of ignoring the foundations ofthe subject-the 
revolutionary processes that led to the collapse of the Old Regime in February 
1917 and the establishment of Soviet power in October.4 It is gratifying, then, to 
read the work of Abraham Ascher on the 1905-7 revolution, Tim McDaniel's 
3 See especially the debates in the Russian Review 45 (1986): 357-413 and 46 (1987): 
375-431. 
4 Most graduate students in major Russian history programs these days choose to write on 
post-1917 topics, especially focusing on the 1920s and 1930s. Original research on the Old 
Regime or, more surprising, on the 1917 revolutions i now rare. 
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historical nd sociological analysis of the labor question in revolutionary Russia, 
and Allan Wildman's econd volume on the revolution i  the army during the 
summer and autumn of 1917. A fourth book, Richard Abraham's hagiographic 
study of Alexander Kerensky, is far less rewarding.5 
Ascher offers a thoughtful and elegant study on what must be the starting point 
for coming to terms with revolution i  twentieth-century Russia. The events of 
1905-7 constituted a violent upheaval in the cities and countryside and a powerful 
merging of revolutionary social forces drawn from artisans, blue- and white-collar 
workers, the free professions and intelligentsia, and the peasantry. It shaped 
fundamental attitudes, ideologies, and institutions-the new political parties, trade 
unions, and Soviets, as well as the quasi-constitutional system launched by the 
October Manifesto and the policies of the autocracy, including those of Stolypin, 
for example-and was in every sense a powerful model for the actors of 1917. 
Ascher has produced a masterful synthesis n narrative form of the 1905 events. 
(A second volume will cover 1906-7.) 
The 1905 revolution was indeed "unique" and "unprecedented inscale and 
ferocity."6 From its origins in the social fragmentation generated by rapid 
industrialization n an agrarian society and the growing hostility between educated 
elites and the bureaucratic and military foundations of tsarist authority, the 
revolution-which really began in the autumn of 1904 with the banquet 
campaigns of "liberal" intelligentsia and professionals-cut a bloody swathe 
through Russia that momentarily united the twin streams of the plebian (workers, 
peasants, white-collar workers) and liberal social movements. To this volatile 
mixture was added the grievances of the nationalities. Ascher well understands the 
ambiguous outcome of the 1905 events, which resulted in "only a partial victory 
for the opposition." For him, 1905 produced "no fundamental changes in the 
economic and social structure ofsociety" and political changes "so general" that 
their ultimate significance ould only be worked out in the less than favorable 
circumstances of post-1905 autocratic retrenchment and the experiments of 
Stolypin. Ascher downplays the power of social movements in1905 and advances 
such traditional explanations for the ambiguous outcomes as the stubborn 
unwillingness ofthe autocrat (and certain key supporters of "unlimited autoc- 
racy") to make timely concessions, the lack of coordination ( ot to mention 
different interests) of the social and national movements, and "society's deep 
distrust of the authorities," which, when combined with the lack of political 
experience of ministers and opposition leaders alike, led to the party leaders 
missing the opportunity o join a Witte cabinet in the fall of 1905. In The 
Revolution of 1905 Ascher provides the full panoply of events and movements, 
yet the reader comes away feeling somewhat shortchanged by the lack of new 
5 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, Calif., 1988), 
Ascher's book will be followed with a second volume covering the continuation of the revolution 
and restoration of authority in 1906-7; Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Capitalism and Revolution in 
Russia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988); Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial 
Army, vol. 2, The Road to Soviet Power and Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1987); Richard Abraham, 
Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution (New York, 1987). 
6 Ascher, p. 341. 
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interpretations a dthe failure to establish some sort of hierarchy inthe impact of 
social factors upon politics. 
The ambiguities of 1905-7 worked themselves out in the revolutions of 1917. 
The autocracy collapsed under the weight of World War I and the mass discontent 
of workers, peasants, and the army. The "liberals" did come to power, if only 
briefly, and the various parties and social movements crystallized around the 
discourse of class struggle. In 1917, however, the plebeians turned the tables on 
"propertied" Russia and all those above them in the workplace and social 
hierarchies. Fueled by massive peasant unrest, a remarkably well-organized labor 
movement that embraced both blue- and white-collar workers, and the continuing 
revolution i the army (and navy), the October Revolution produced a Bolshevik 
government, or"Soviet power," which can be seen at least in political terms as 
a resolution of the problem of unstable state power dating back to the 1905 period. 
The October Revolution, which of course cannot be reduced to events in October 
1917, was a seminal process in twentieth-century history not simply because it 
became a global model for plebeian revolution but also because it contained the 
origins of the basic social, economic, and political institutions of the Soviet 
Union. The truly exciting openings into Soviet history must ake as their point of 
departure the revolutionary processes that came to fruition i  October. 
Here McDaniel's bold conceptual work makes an important contribution. 
Drawing heavily on social theory, including the unlikely but uncommonly fruitful 
combination of Tocqueville and Trotsky, McDaniel develops a sophisticated 
argument about the uniqueness of Russia's labor movement, a "combined" 
movement that was marked by an "exceptional though uneven militancy and 
solidarity" (p. 51). He traces the source of these characteristics to the Trotskyite 
notion of "autocratic capitalism," a form of economic development that promoted 
a thirst among workers for a unitary worldview even though their social reality 
was marked by fragmentation and their organizations by atomization. In 1917, 
workers were strongly attracted to socialism, and eventually to the Bolshevik 
variant, in part because they had already been conditioned to reject liberal 
politics, the rule of law, and parliamentary procedure and had found very 
attractive a view of state power that was by no means anarchist or antistate. 
Indeed, the working class wished for a strong state that would protect hem and 
represent only their own class interest. For McDaniel, the language and reality of 
class conflict were indeed the motor forces of history in 1917, but not in a crudely 
deterninistic sense. Russia's workers were neither the anarchic mass portrayed by 
the Mensheviks, liberals, and right-wingers nor the self-conscious class described 
by the Bolsheviks and some recent labor historians. The workers organized into 
a "combined movement quite united in its radicalism, yet socially fragmented" 
(p. 351). Here McDaniel slips into the determinist camp. Given the nature of the 
Russian labor movement and the structures within which it operated, neither the 
Mensheviks nor the Provisional Government ever really had a chance. McDaniel 
goes out of his way to exonerate the Mensheviks and the Provisional Government, 
with their well-conceived and logical positions that could not gain working-class 
allegiance. Bolshevism took advantage of the situation and offered a break with 
the past, a consistently static model of modernization "based on a rigid doctrine 
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of harmony." For McDaniel, Bolshevism played upon the centralizing and 
bureaucratic tendencies already inherent inthe labor movement and succeeded in 
the aftermath of October in virtually destroying any notion of "civil society." But 
again McDaniel rejects the idea that Russian history developed in a linear fashion, 
from the police state of the tsars to that of the Soviets. He is interested inthe 
texture of change, in the unusual combination ofcapitalism and tradition that led 
to a "new and insoluble set of social and political challenges." The historian's 
mission is to document and understand those challenges. 
The works of Wildman and Abraham provide a study in contrasting styles and 
subject matter. If Wildman carries the banner of the social historians who reveal 
the power of the "revolution from below," Abraham is a throwback toan earlier 
historiography that produced biographies of the revolution's leaders and ignored 
society altogether. Wildman carries out his mandate far more successfully. The 
second volume of his magisterial The End of the Russian Imperial Army offers a 
vivid panorama of the workings of the committee structure inthe army and is 
arguably the best case study yet of the institutional/social nexus that made 
October possible. Here we see the workings of a nascent "civil society" brought 
forth and nurtured inthe crucible of revolution. Wildman shows the rich array of 
social forces at work in the various army committees and their esponse to the 
political issues of the period. The maximalism of many soldiers and officers was 
tempered by a desire for structure and order as well as a burning quest for social 
justice. 
Abraham, unfortunately, is handicapped by his subject, Alexander Kerensky, 
who despite his enormous visibility in 1917 produced a record of political 
ineptitude, theoretical primitiveness, and even deviousness that make it difficult to
enshrine him, even if only sentimentally, as a hero. Abraham nonetheless tries to 
do so with a considerable amount of energy and good will. He does succeed in 
bringing together for the first time in any language the salient facts and a good deal 
of the pathos of Kerensky's life, though these facts do not at all prove the author's 
point. For example, Abraham performs an important service by laying out 
Kerensky's many organizational ctivities in the revolutionary underground 
during the war prior to the February Revolution. But his evidence in no way 
justifies the assertion that Kerensky was Russia's leading revolutionary during the 
war. 
The date October 1917 has served to separate artificially the revolutionary 
tradition and an entire range of social and cultural movements from their 
evolution and fate under Soviet power. That is why we must not lose sight of the 
roots of Soviet history in the late Imperial period and in 1917-hence the 
importance of the works discussed above for the study of Soviet history proper. 
Those who want to restore or create "civil society" in today's Soviet Union 
would do well to examine carefully the record of social activism and civic 
consciousness displayed by a wide variety of social groups from 1905 through 
1917. The failure of the democratically oriented civic elements in 1917 is 
perhaps the principal tragedy of that Revolution. The reasons for their failure 
transcend the October demarcation and must remain high on the historical 
agenda for the period 1917-29. 
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II. THE NEW SOVIET HISTORY 
In recent years historians have brought the methods of social and cultural history 
and the excitement of discovery to the post-October period. They have shown 
fantastic energy and ingenuity inexploiting new sources and tackling problems 
and issues central to what should become a new set of explanations of how the 
Soviet Union developed first into an extremely authoritarian party/state nd then 
into the troubled but reforming global power of today. The richness of this 
historical scholarship may yet allow us to view the real content of Soviet social 
and political institutions, to better understand how things worked in their own 
terms, how people lived, suffered, and made their way in the world. The works 
under eview here explore a variety of structures and movements hat refocus our 
understanding of such issues as state versus ociety, the role of culture, and the 
origins and meaning of Stalinism. Here we have a new wave of scholars building 
upon the works of such pioneers as Moshe Lewin, Loren Graham, David 
Joravsky, and Sheila Fitzpatrick. (Fortunately, all of these pacesetters are still very 
much engaged in redefining the field.) The books considered here include two 
important works on the Civil War/War Communism period (1918-21),7 a study 
of private traders and entrepreneurs during the 1920s,8 two works that deal 
directly with Stalin and Stalinism,9 and three that seek to explain Stalinism as a 
cultural system and manner of govemance by exploring specific areas of social, 
economic, and cultural life.10 Finally, we have a detailed study of the Stalin 
regime in action at the moment of its greatest challenge, during the first two years 
of domestic mobilization after the German invasion on June 22, 1941.11 
Particularly rich are the studies now being produced on the social and cultural 
dimensions of revolutionary state building, its twin process ociety building, and 
their impact on politics. This new work is marked by scrupulous attention to 
untapped published (and in some cases archival) sources and a mission to look 
behind the conventional labels of "state," "society," and "party," reexamining 
the role of the leader figures, Lenin and Stalin, and redefining such paradigms as 
totalitarianism and, especially, Stalinism. Most of post-1917 Soviet history has 
been a series of blank pages that are just now being filled in. Even old questions 
such as the nature of Leninism, the relationship ofLeninism and the early years 
of Soviet power to the Stalin regime, and the social and cultural content of 
7 Isabel A. Tirado, Young Guard! The Communist Youth League of Petrograd, 1917-1920 
(New York, 1988); and Richard Sakwa, Soviet Communists in Power: A Study of Moscow during 
the Civil War, 1918-21 (New York, 1988). 
8 Alan M. Ball, Russia's Last Capitalists: The Nepmen, 1921-1929 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1987). 
9 Michal Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution" 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1987); and Robert McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler (New York, 1988). 
10 Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian 
Revolution (New York, 1989); Douglas Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation and 
Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia (Bloomington, Ind., 1988); and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 
Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity (Cambridge, 1988). " Klaus Segbers, Die Sowjetunion im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Mobilisierung von Verwaltung, 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im "Grossen Vaterldndischer; K ieg," 1941-1943 (Munich, 1987). 
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Stalinism provoke new answers when examined through the lens of fresh sources 
and topics. Studies of Stalin and Stalinism have long passed beyond the immediate 
post-World War II totalitarian school in which social scientific models coexisted 
uneasily with classic life-and-times biographical studies of the great leaders of the 
revolution. 12 In the mid- 1970s and early 1980s three important books took a fresh 
look at "Stalinism" and came up with avariety of abstract ommentaries onSoviet 
history during the Stalin period.'3 Important models were put forth portraying 
Stalinism as a "mono-organizational society" or as "revolution from above." 
Seweryn Bialer defined "mature Stalinism" by such traits as "mass terror," "the 
extinction of the party as a movement," "the shapelessness of the macropolitical 
organization," "the extreme mobilizational model of economic growth," "a het- 
erogeneous value system which favored economic status and power stratification, 
fostered extraordinary cultural conformity, and was tied to extreme nationalism," 
"the end of the revolutionary impulse to change society and the persistence of a 
conservative status quo attitude toward existing institutions," and "the system of 
personal dictatorship as a symbol of general arbitrary use of power.' 14 The problem 
with such a finely honed list is that it fails to distinguish between Stalin the person 
and Stalinism as a governing system. This model seems to fit any period of Soviet 
history (at least through the Brezhnev regime). It comes remarkably close to the 
classic characteristics of totalitarianism. 15 
Any new understanding of the Stalin regime will require a large dose of 
discovery, of the writing of history from below, and of the unusual patterns of 
mutual influence of "state" and "society." New work-sometimes called 
revisionist-on the purges and collectivization, for example, has begun to lay 
these foundations-and, despite loud protests about the moral insensitivity of
discussing social support for Stalinism, describing the purges of the 1930s as not 
entirely planned or centralized, and promulgating a vision of Stalinism as the 
"state against itself," the historiography is growing bolder and is maturing. Ideas 
once regarded in some quarters as revisionist (and not without suspicion or even 
outright ostility)-for example, that he center was not always in control of the 
12 For a review of the role of the totalitarian model and its critics, see Stephen F. Cohen, 
"Scholarly Missions: Sovietology as a Vocation," in his Rethinking the Soviet Experience: 
Politics and History since 1917 (New York, 1985), pp. 3-37. Recently Jerry Hough, an astute 
critic of the limitations of the totalitarian model, has raised it again as a valid model for 
understanding both the Lenin and Stalin regimes and for comparisons of the Soviet Union with 
Nazi Germany (see Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform [New York, 
1988]). For a thoughtful statement on the cultural and historical origins and role of the totalitarian 
model, see Abbott Gleason, "'Totalitarianism' in 1984," Russian Review 43 (1984): 145-59. 
Gleason argues that any concept that could have caught the attention of so many intelligent 
observers must have some validity. 
13 Robert C. Tucker, ed., Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York, 1977); 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington, hId., 1978); 
and Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge, 1980). 
14 Bialer, p. 10. 
15 This is Henry Reichman's argument in his article "Reconsidering 'Stalinism'," Theory and 
Society 17 (1988): 57-89. 
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periphery; that central state authorities often had a dim vision of their goals and 
an even dimmer one of how to arrive at them; that Stalin's policies generated 
genuine nthusiasm and popular support; hat politics did exist under Stalin; that 
social groups could do the police work of the state; and that conservative cultural 
norms had some foundation i  social reality-are now informing the work of 
many serious cholars, who with patience and perseverence are mining the newly 
opened archives and recently more hospitable ibraries of the Soviet Union. In the 
works of many "Soviet" historians, uch views are not meant o absolve Stalin 
or the "center" of moral culpability in the horrors of the Stalin years. All this 
implies that further breakthroughs arepossible. 
Richard Sakwa explores the origins of Bolshevik government in Moscow 
during the era of War Communism and the Civil War. The question is the origins 
of Bolshevik authoritarianism during this period, and Sakwa sets forth a biting 
argument to show that authoritarian government was primarily a product of 
Bolshevik ideology and not simply a response to the requirements of fighting the 
Civil War. Sakwa sets out to attack Soviet and Western historians who like to 
portray the earliest months of rule by Lenin's party, November 1917-April 1918, 
as moderate and as an early version of the nonauthoritarian New Economic Policy 
(NEP) that was interrupted bythe almost fanatical claims of War Communism-a 
set of policies not to be equated with those of mainstream Leninism. Sakwa 
relentlessly pursues ideology as the chief cause of Bolshevik excess during the 
Civil War. He rejects notions of Russian backwardness and post-1917 continuities 
with the Old Regime in institutions and political culture, preferring instead to 
view the revolution as a sharp break with the past: "Whatever the previous level 
of development ofcivil society, the Bolshevik regime destroyed not only the old 
state system but also the features of civil society as it had developed not only as 
part of the bourgeois ystem but also within the workers' movement and 
ultimately within the Bolshevik party itself.'"16 
The "fusion of politics and ideology" becomes the framework that encom- 
passes much important material about the emergence of municipal, state, and 
party institutions in Moscow during 1918-21. This powerful argument about 
ideology reminds us of the need for "total history," of the importance of not 
compartmentalizing the realm of ideas from either politics or society. One can 
deconstruct Lenin's "What Is to Be Done?" with its bold assertions about 
consciousness and spontaneity, and see through the rhetoric to a fundamental 
cultural obsession with control and power. But this kind of analysis requires firm 
links with social groups, the actors or bearers of the cultural norms. Here Sakwa 
falls short. His vision of ideology is far too literal, and he explicitly rejects the 
possibility that social forces might have any role at all in his story. This is most 
certainly not an exercise in the New Cultural History. 
For Sakwa there is a direct connection between Lenin and Stalin, especially in 
the authoritarian i stitutions spawned by Bolshevik ideology. State and party 
bureaucracies quickly negated the democratic and grass roots impulses momen- 
16 Sakwa (n. 7 above), p. 14. 
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tarily nurtured in soviets and other "genuine mass popular organizations" (p. 
273). He argues that "in a sense the Bolshevik project was a thoroughly 
bureaucratized one from the first, and hence the idea of a later degeneration must 
be treated with skepticism. The party organisation a d its committees from the 
first absorbed or destroyed all intermediary aggregations between themselves and 
society." For all his important research in the intricacies of Moscow institution 
building and politics during the Civil War period, Sakwa retums to traditional 
interpretations f Bolshevik authoritarianism built upon the radical separation of 
state and society. 
This is the opposite of Tirado's view that it was the Civil War that produced the 
authoritarianism that changed what she sees as an independent and vital youth 
movement into the hierarchical party instrument of the Komsomol. The beauty of 
Tirado's book is precisely its emphasis on youth. It looks at a vital and, indeed, 
powerful social group that cuts across class lines and moves the discussion away 
from the all too frequent tendency to view the revolution entirely in terms of 
workers or peasants. It also shows how social movements are transformed bythe 
revolution and how in the youth movement, as in so many other spheres (e.g., 
cultural nd economic policy, to name just two), the Bolshevik outcome was built 
upon earlier left-wing, radical youth organizations that had staked out potent roles 
independent ofthe party during 1917-18. The attractiveness of nonclass ocial 
and political organizations toworking-class youth was limited, however. During 
1917, such youth organizations as the Socialist League of Young Workers quickly 
began to attract more students and white-collar workers than factory workers. 
Still, Russian youth organized into yet another "spontaneous" social force that 
began even in 1917 to evolve into a more structured organization of "the 
politically committed." Vague sympathies with the Bolsheviks and the revolution 
generated concrete programs of support, a change of name to the Communist 
Youth League (dominated by party members, of course), and eventually elitism, 
exclusivity, and bureaucratic control. 
We still need a new rendering of the Soviet state that probes more deeply its 
cultural and social roots to discover how social forces unleashed or uplifted by 
revolution i fused the structures ofthe state. What Sakwa does show, however, is
the remarkable conflict that surrounded institution building during this formative 
period of Soviet history. Conflict ook place both among and within the 
Komsomol and the party and trade unions, for example, with the forces of 
"reform" and "democracy" emerging as losers by 1921. It was as if politics had 
become firmly rooted in a corporative, bureaucratic polity that pitted rival groups 
of nonworkers (with or without worker allies) against one another. With the 
bourgeoisie (and the nobility) gone, class politics were no longer appropriate; 
indeed, class identity itself would become increasingly problematic.17 It would 
17 See the discussion of Leopold H. Haimson, "The Problem of Social Identities in Early 
Twentieth-Century Russia," pp. 3-20; William G. Rosenberg, "Identities, Power and Social 
Interaction i Revolutionary Russia," pp. 21-28; and Alfred J. Rieber, "Landed Property, State 
Authority, and Civil War," pp. 29-38-all in Slavic Review, vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring 1988); and 
the discussion of Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Bolsheviks' Dilemma: Class, Culture, and Politics in 
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not be too farfetched tosay that some of the energies of class conflict became 
absorbed in the corporate struggles within the party and state institutions that had 
co-opted the infrastructure of the intelligentsia, the lower middle strata, and the 
working class.'8 
Michal Reiman and Alan M. Ball break new ground in their studies of NEP 
society and politics.'9 Reiman's book caused a stir when first published in 
Germany in 1979. It is based on hitherto unexploited copies of Soviet documents 
(key State Political Directorate [GPU] [political police and forerunner ofthe 
Committee for State Security (KGB)] reports and correspondence, e.g.) found in 
the archive of the German foreign ministry. These documents permit the author to 
trace the step-by-step reaction of the Stalin-dominated party leadership to what 
Reiman sees as a deepening social crisis at the end of NEP. Reiman wants to 
document the birth of Stalinism, by which he means the regime's political choice 
to respond to a largely self-generated crisis with a program of social terror. He 
sheds new light on the role of the GPU in the late 1920s and particularly onthe 
role of its leader, V. Menzhinsky, as a key supporter of the emerging Stalin 
coalition. Menzhinsky was a major player in debates over economic policy and its 
relationship to diplomacy. In 1928 he garnered support for expanded GPU 
coercive powers to extricate the Soviet Union from a life-threatening economic 
crisis. The working class in 1928 was suffering its own crisis-a combination of
severe hardship and a crisis of identity that pitted generations against each other. 
For a time, the GPU stepped in to support managers and specialists in order to 
keep industrial enterprises alive. Reiman tells a compelling story that brings out 
the connections between foreign and trade policy and the regime's manipulation 
of the threat of foreign encirclement and internal opposition, fostering a mood that 
rapidly came to hold the regime itself as prisoner. For Reiman, the "Stalin leap 
forward" at the end of the twenties had nothing to do with socialism, and 
therefore the entire Stalin experience should not be cited as proof of Marxism's 
failure in the twentieth century. Further, Reiman maintains that the essence of 
Stalinism was its social dimension, the combination of purposefully unmanaged 
crisis and the emergence of a stratum of bureaucrats cut off from the masses. Here 
he firmly rejects the view of Roy Medvedev, whom he labels an apologist for an 
idealized Leninism, or the true socialism that was distorted by the evil Stalin. 
Still, questions remain about the reliability ofReiman's handful of documents and 
the relative weight hat should be given to the views expressed therein. The book 
is weakest when it tries to connect he momentous social process of industrial- 
ization in the late 1920s to the realm of high politics. 
Questions of class identity, the nature of NEP society, and the problem of 
alternatives come to the fore in Alan Ball's study of the Nepmen (and women). 
the Early Soviet Years," pp. 599-613; Ronald Grigor Suny, "Class and State in the Early Soviet 
Period: A Reply to Sheila Fitzpatrick," pp. 614-19; and Daniel Orlovsky, "Social History and 
Its Categories," pp. 620-23; and Fitzpatrick's reply (pp. 624-26)-all in Slavic Review, vol. 
47, no. 4 (Winter 1988). 
18 This comes close to the "state against itself" formulation fGabor T. Ritterspom, "Soviet 
Politics in the 1930's: Rehabilitating Society," Studies in Comparative Communism 19, no. 2 
(1986): 105-28, and "Rethinking Stalinism," Russian History 11, no. 4 (1984): 343-61. 
19 Ball (n. 8 above); and Reiman (n. 9 above). 
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Who were these people, suddenly liberated from the oppression of the class war 
to produce, buy, sell, employ, and otherwise try to put their stamp upon the 
emerging socialist society? Were they only survivors, trying to stay afloat against 
impossible odds, or did they have larger designs upon the socialist polity? What 
was their function? Ball provides the answers in a well-researched and well- 
crafted study of the group of 500,000 or so individuals who manufactured, 
managed, bartered, and traded in the quasi-markets ofthe 1920s. This is fresh 
material. We learn that unemployed women and former merchants, shop employ- 
ees, and artisans were most active in these new economic activities. Further, we 
see just how important their efforts were for the population at large and even for 
the state or socialist sector. The Nepmen supplied much to the state and provided 
the goods and services that the unproductive state and cooperative sectors could 
not offer-and this was part of the enormous resentment, class envy and 
animosity, insecurity, and marginality that festered throughout the 1920s in 
relation to NEP and those who made it work. Ball's work is outstanding in
documenting the lack of security, institutional guarantees, and social legitimacy 
that afflicted the Nepmen. From this perspective, the rapidity and violence with 
which they were dispatched in the reheated class war of the late 1920s was a 
perfectly ogical outcome. 
The social and cultural dimensions of the Russian Revolution and the nature of 
the Stalin regime-what we have come to call "Stalinism"-is the subject of 
three xciting and original books by Stites, Weiner, and Siegelbaum. Each author 
addresses the issue of politics through the lenses of society and culture. Stites's 
Revolutionary Dreams is a moving and passionate study of the utopian impulses 
that fueled the revolutionary process during and after 1917 and their fate during 
the 1920s and early 1930s. For Stites, utopianism, defined as "social and cultural 
experimentation, a ddrastic self-conscious innovation-symbolic and concrete," 
is central to all "major social revolutions of modem times."20 This living 
experimentalism in the arts, popular culture, religion, life-styles, architecture, 
mythmaking, the organization of labor and management, and the like was a 
particularly strong motive force in the Russian Revolution as "both a product of 
the revolutionary upheaval and a part of its force and emotional content." Stites 
locates the roots of revolutionary utopianism in the religious and popular utopias 
of Old Regime Russia, and he brilliantly demonstrates how the way was paved for 
Stalin's own powerful counterutopia bya deeply rooted Russian state tradition of 
"administrative utopia" with "its peculiar blend of symmetry, brute force, and 
benevolence.'"21 Stites writes movingly about the entire range of experiments in
the post-October period, ranging from iconoclasm and festivals to the god- 
building of Lunacharsky and Bogdanov. The latter held the view that he essence 
of religion, its spiritual human bond, could be attained without God. They 
foresaw, even before 1917, a world of dreams, myths, sounds, and rituals that 
would elevate humanity todivine status and bring about collective immortality. 
Stites offers a superb analysis of Emilian Yaroslavsky's League of the Militant 
Godless with its relatively noncoercive agitational pproach of converting people 
20 Stites (n. 10 above), p. 3. 
21 Ibid., p. 252. 
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to the view that science was adequate to explain all phenomena. His descriptions 
of the rituals of birth, marriage, and death are priceless entrees into the energized 
world of social revolution. We learn of Octoberings (the revolutionary equivalent 
of baptisms) with children receiving such names as Traktorina, Tekstil, Robesper, 
Marks, Engelina, Barrikada, nd the like. There is the touching story of the first 
recorded Octobering in Kharkov in 1923 with its gifts of portraits of the infant 
Lenin, solemn parental promises to raise their child in the spirit of Marxism- 
Leninism, and singing of the Internationale ong with folk songs. Stites is careful 
not to confuse the peasants' "fantastic ability to absorb new faiths and rituals" 
with claims that bolshevism actually constituted a religion. In this he follows 
Maurice Hindus, who called it a "nonfaith because it was not forgiving, 
possessed no deity, exalted science and nature, and possessed a 'revolutionary' 
system of ethics instead of a humane one. It lacked beauty, dignity and spirit"; the 
philosopher Berdyaev, who emphasized its lack of "inward drama nd depth, its 
weakness in religious psychology, and its pedantry"; and Mao Zedong, who said 
simply, "Marxism-Leninism has no beauty, nor has it any mystical value. It is 
only extremely useful."22 
For Stites, Stalinism is the central trope, the historical reality that stands in 
opposition to the creative, life-promoting, energetic nature of the pre-1929 
communist society. For Stites, this revolutionary, proletarian morality was 
"modern, full spirited, humane, rational and healthy." Stalinism represents he 
"deutopianizing of the revolution."23 The "cultural revolution" of 1928-31 
marked the turning point. Stites brilliantly shows in semiotic terms how the 
Stalinist revolution co-opted and destroyed the earlier utopianism by replacing the 
eclectic, spontaneous communalism of the early revolution with a "directed, 
imposed, monolithic version for the sake of a collective goal defined by leaders 
and the deified 'I."' For Stites, Stalinism is a "wholly appropriate name for the 
new political culture born in the 1930's," consisting of (1) the ever-present 
authoritarian elements in bolshevism; (2) the military zeal generated to control and 
orchestrate the transformation (collectivization a d industrialization); (3) Stalin's 
personal despotism; (4) the persistent Russian state bureaucratic heritage; and (5) 
the social authoritarianism of the Russian people themselves.24 Stalin's revolu- 
tionary utopia was different from that of the tsars in its dynamism and in its ability, 
generated by Stalin's personal role, to magnify the natural elements of fantasy that 
must accompany all radical change. Stalin's self-image as father, uler, elder of 
the collective resonated widely throughout the social and cultural field, and Stites 
is particularly sharp in marshalling his material concerning the astonishingly 
powerful Stalin cult of the 1930s. Stites ucceeds in filling the abstract vessel of 
Stalinism with social and cultural content, though in using the term he runs the 
risk of ignoring the roots of the Stalinist counterutopia in Lenin's basic dichotomy 
in "What Is to Be Done?" -consciousness/spontaneity-and i  the intricate 
history of the party and the state from 1917 to 1928. Of course, Stites's themes 
22 Ibid., p. 122. 
23 Ibid., pp. 226-27. 
24 Ibid., p. 243. 
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must be placed in the full context of the 1920s. One must weigh 1920s utopianism 
against the depth of the pluralism of the 1920s and ask how important 
conductorless orchestras nd plans for megacities, complete with "graphs of life" 
that attempted tojoin daily communal life and architectural planning, were in 
relation to such powerful issues as state building, social movements (formation 
and reformation f social and occupational groups, including workers and 
bureaucrats), the emergence of a new Soviet intelligentsia, agriculture, and the 
party's own intolerance of dissent. 
One of Stites's most important contributions is his analysis of the cult of the 
machine and of organizations launched by Gastev and Kerzhentsev to spread 
Taylorist visions of a self-regulating, technocratic society among the still argely 
agrarian and relatively unsophisticated Soviet workers and managers. The stories 
of Gastev's Scientific Organization of Labor (NOT) movement, his Central 
Institute of Labor (1920-38), and Kerzhentsev's League of Time (the attempt to 
move Taylorism from the factories to all spheres of everyday life) offer insights 
into today's dilemmas in the USSR. They provide xamples of the facility with 
which conservative counterutopias c n be built upon liberationist foundations.25 
Douglas Weiner's tudy of the ecology and conservation movements of the 
1920s fits rather neatly into a similar framework. Once again, a flourishing 
prerevolutionary cultural movement ( his time in the scientific realm) is even 
further liberated by the revolution and assumes a vibrant place in the still 
pluralistic s ientific community ofthe 1920s. The life sciences became a major 
ideological battleground during the cultural revolution. Particularly disturbing to
certain Bolsheviks and their minions in the scientific community was the notion 
that all people were not biologically identical and that human ature, "whatever 
it might be," was a roadblock to the egalitarianism and collectivism espoused by 
the more rabid proponents of"the great change." 
The Stalinists rejected theory (in the form of bourgeois cience) and promoted 
miracles: vernalization, acclimatization, and the attendant social miracle of 
collectivization fagriculture, which were to be produced or assisted by a purely 
utilitarian science. The search for miracles took place behind the mask of 
revolutionary utilitarianism and practicality. According to Weiner, the Stalinist 
view (espoused by little Stalin-scientists) was "not willing to accept Biology's 
limited ability to know, predict and control events and unable to live with the 
limitations ofacting in a statistically probabalistic middle ground."26 Nature was 
meant to be transformed, and the ecological view that promoted the healthy 
functioning ofnatural systems was deemed not useful enough-indeed, it was a 
point of view that could only be espoused by the class enemy. 
The attack on science became part of the larger attack on NEP. Weiner argues 
convincingly that the new Stalinist science violated the commitment ofearlier 
25 For another first-rate examination of the issue of revolution and culture, see Zenovia A. 
Sochor, Revolution and Culture: The Bogdanov-Lenin Controversy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988); and the 
more recent book by Lynn Mally, Culture of the Future: The Proleticult Movement in 
Revolutionary Russia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990); Mark Von Hagen, Soldiers in the 
Proletarian Dictatorship (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990). 
26 Weiner (n. 10 above), p. 130. 
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radical Russian scientists ouse the study of nature to "draw conclusions about he 
larger social and political world." The cultural revolutionists wanted a science 
limited to the role of " handmaiden totechnology." The larger social and political 
questions were to be left to the metascience of Marxist dialectical materialism. 
The Lysenkos and Prezents (leading figures in the new Stalinist scientific 
establishment) flourished insuch an atmosphere, as did yet another version of the 
state against itself. Weiner tells a highly original tale of institutional empire 
building and turf wars that began soon after the October Rev tion. The various 
commissariats controlled extensive networks and resources, including educational 
and research institutions and even the nature reserves (zapovedniki) that were so 
central to the conservation movement. Weiner documents he role of professional 
organizations and congresses and of the professional press in promoting Stalinist 
science. This was another example of revolution from below, or perhaps 
revolution from within.27 Dialectics became the measuring rod of proletarian 
morality and scientific truth. Even the moderate "mechanists" who considered 
dialectics a proper guiding philosophical worldview, but one that should not be 
consciously imposed on an empirical science that was entirely capable of 
ascertaining the dialectical structure ofnature, were beaten by the Deborinites, 
who saw them as the antidialectical favorites of the "bourgeois professoriate."28 
The door was now open to the condemnation fentire scientific fields, not to 
mention generations of talented individuals. Nature too was a victim, as can be 
seen from present day ecological disasters in the Soviet Union. The growing 
ecological movement inthe Soviet Union today owes much to the vision, courage, 
and sound scientific methods of its early Soviet predecessors. 
Rethinking Stalinism requires a deeper understanding of the basic social and 
political processes of the entire Soviet period. Lewis Siegelbaum takes the 
exploration beyond the cultural revolution i to the industrialization process of the 
1930s. His subject is Stakhanovism, that stunning myth of mass mobilization 
named for the miner Aleksei Stakhanov, who on the night of August 30-31, 1935 
hewed 102 tons of coal, or fourteen times his quota.29 Stakhanov's example was 
quickly taken up by authorities eager to motivate workers and managers alike, and 
in this sense the mass movement they forged of those who exceeded their norms 
may be seen as one more in a long series of largely unsuccessful attempts o 
overcome the market. Here we are drawn into the sinews of Soviet society during 
the Stalin years-the factory workplace with its nexus of laborers, foremen, 
technical personnel, and management; the place of Stakhanovite workers in the 
larger society; the cultural implications of the movement; and the relationship of
the surprisingly fragmented central party and state organs to these social groups 
and institutions. This is the "politics of productivity," the maneuvering and 
27 For a particularly good discussion of the issue of the sources of self-censorship, of the 
capacity of professional groups of intelligentsia tocreate a Stalinist line from below, that is, to 
think and act in Stalinist erms, see Leonid Heller, "Restructuring Literary Memory in the 
USSR," Survey 30, no. 4 (June 1989): 44-65. 
28 Weiner, p. 126. 
29 Siegelbaum (n. 10 above), p. 2. 
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accommodation that infused the industrialization drive of the 1930s in which 
"society" succeeded in contaminating the "state." State and society become 
mutually interpenetrating entities manifested atall levels, from the workplace up 
through the ministries. Stalinism for Siegelbaum is "an amalgam of practices that 
both impinged on and were subjected to appropriation bydifferent groups and 
institutions. "30
Siegelbaum rejects earlier Western interpretations f the Stakhanovite move- 
ment. These include the view that it was a generally positive rationalization f the 
workplace made necessary by the inefficiency and laziness of the average Russian 
worker; the negative view that it exacerbated the "lack of proportionality among 
different enterprises and sectors, thus intensifying the planlessness of the entire 
system' %;31 and that it resulted in serious disruptions inproduction, the increases 
ascribed to the productivity of Stakhanovites infact being the result of "thor- 
oughgoing modernization fplant that brought improvements in the technical 
organization ofproduction."32 A corollary to this view is that Stakhanovism had 
a political function: itallowed the regime to create a privileged caste of industrial 
workers. This comes close to Trotsky's view that Stakhanovism represented the 
apotheosis of piece rates and that it was a planned attempt o undermine 
working-class solidarity by the creation of a labor aristocracy. 
In an argument that sheds much light on the workings of the Stalin regime, 
Siegelbaum shows that Stakhanovism was not a strategy developed by a 
government that had a clear idea of what it wanted to accomplish. Nor was it 
directed solely at workers. It was an ad hoc response to long-standing control and 
motivational problems in the workplace that had been compounded by rapid 
industrialization and the constantly shifting composition (in terms of social class 
and levels of skill and education) of labor and management.33 The fact that he 
state had wavered between conditional support and outright hostility in its 
relationships to both groups reinforced a politics of protection and informal 
patronage that ended to preserve considerable autonomy for local interests. The 
lineage of Stakhanovism extended back to the socialist competition a d shock 
work of the 1920s, which expressed the energy and ambition of new cadres of 
skilled workers, especially toward the end of that decade. But these mobilizations 
went nowhere because of bureaucratization and the creation of false campaigns 
and production results through the collusion of the trade unions, enterprise 
management, and party cells, who all felt the pressure of higher norms. 
Management was free to reward the labor it found worthy, and it often rewarded 
the bootlickers or simply made everyone a shockworker, thereby deflating the 
concept. 
30 Ibid., p. 6. 
31 This was the view of the Menshevik labor activist Solomon Schwarz, writing in 
Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, quoted in ibid., p. 4. 
32 The argument of Donald Filtzer in Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The 
Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations (Arnonk, N.Y., 1986). 
33 Siegelbaum's book should be read along with the superb work of Hiroaki Kuromiya on the 
political and social dimensions of Stalin's industrial drive, 1928-32 (Kuromiya, Stalin's 
Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932 [Cambridge, 1988]). 
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Siegelbaum's lively story unmasks the deed itself, Stakhanov's apparently 
heroic feat. The fact is that Stakhanov's achievement was something of a 
Potemkin village. He did not work alone, as was implied in initial reports and 
later propaganda. His hewing of coal depended on the teamwork of several other 
workers and supervisors, and indeed the entire performance was stage-managed 
from the outset o gain optimal results. In no way could his accomplishment be 
reproduced, even by the most zealous workers functioning in the normal 
workplace. What, then, did the state supporters of this stunt have in mind? 
Siegelbaum has discerned four motives: (1) to create a mass movement; (2) to 
overcome chronic stoppages in production flow (perceived as the result of 
informal conditions on the shop floor and inadequately trained personnel); (3) to 
test he commitment of production specialists (technical personnel and managers); 
and (4) to assault existing shop floor practices by turning the unusual Stakhanovite 
moment into the norm. 
What did the freshly minted Stakhanovite workers gain? For the most fortunate 
(and these were a distinct minority) there were promotions into various lower level 
managerial positions and a bevy of consumer goods, all providing rist for the 
propaganda mill and images of workers living the middle-class dream. For the 
rest, there was the resentment of fellow workers (and managers) and the 
unrealized reams of material gains brought on by a troubled economy and the 
onset of war. The sorry fact is that Stakhanovism did not begin to address the 
structural problems of labor productivity or any other large issue in Soviet 
industry. Itwas a classic lesson in the weakness of the mobilizational mode of 
overcoming the market, a lesson that unfortunately hasnot been learned to the 
present day. 
All of these volumes point oward a more complete understanding of the Stalin 
era and of the dictator's personal role. They revise the revisionists inthat they 
argue that he center (Stalin or his governing bloc) had a large responsibility for 
the most extreme domestic policies of cultural revolution, industrialization, 
collectivization, and the purges. This is true even if the center's policies were 
unplanned or furthered by a large segment of society. These works reject the 
notion of a diffuse responsibility and causality that portrays Stalin as only a distant 
figure chairing an executive board or as a mediator of rival groups or factions. In 
these studies Stalin's role is integrated into its various contexts. One comes away 
realizing that he driving force or the essence of Soviet history iscertainly larger 
than Stalin alone, that society and culture and local politics also mattered, but that 
one can't reduce Stalinism to a purely social or administrative phenomenon that 
artificially seals off politics from culture or the center from the periphery. Stalin 
was far more than "chairman of the board," someone who mediated and 
harmonized a variety of institutional and politburo viewpoints. His role was more 
forceful and influential. He set the tone, fixed and sent the signals, blatant and 
subtle, which in the political culture of the period were readily picked up by 
thousands of smaller or would-be Stalins in the party and state apparatus. Yet 
political institutions were fragmented, and such historical phenomena as Stakha- 
novism and perhaps even the purges developed with a logic that was not fully 
determined by Stalin's direct intervention. 
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Among the legacies of the 1930s was a docile, traumatized, and insecure 
population and a new cadre of managers (and workers) whose uncertainties and 
anxieties were a way of life despite their empowennent within the bureaucratized 
structures ofheavy industry. This bureaucratic system and the larger society were 
in a macabre fashion well prepared for the new wave of total mobilizations called 
forth by the Nazi invasion in 1941. This is a major theme in Klaus Segbers's 
important s udy of wartime economic administration. Segbers reveals in massive 
detail the institutional, social, and political dimensions of the mobilization of 
Soviet heavy industry, transport, and society for the unparalleled conflict against 
Nazi Germany. The record was impressive, though not as impressive as official 
Soviet mythmakers would have us believe. The positive results of wartime 
mobilization were due neither to the genius of Stalin/Party/People (th  official 
line) nor to the accomplishments of the centrally planned economy (Vosnesen- 
sky's analysis). Rather, the successes resulted from the flexibility and ingenuity 
with which the apparently bloated and rigidly centralized bureaucracy of the 
thirties gave way to new institutions, methods of mobilization, and informal 
patterns of operation that made the economy function. Stalin, according to 
Segbers, was a very important figure in all this, but "no more and no less" (p. 
298). A large group of industrial dministrators and planners as well as other 
high-ranking government and party officials had enormous influence on the 
successful effort. The war thus represented a kind of liberation, a heady time of 
extreme challenge and loosening of the most stifling restraints within the 
economic and administrative m chanisms. Segbers is especially good on unin- 
tended consequences. Concerning the labor force, for example, he shows that he 
influx into factories of massive numbers of women and peasants eased the process 
of breaking up older workplace patterns (remember Stakhanovism) and introduc- 
ing more efficient production technologies. 
It is heartening tothink that "spontaneous" forces of local or midlevel social 
and bureaucratic initiative did indeed exist after the horrors of the 1930s and that 
they might exist even today. But there were failures, too. Segbers shows that 
despite the relocation of some fifteen hundred factories from the front-line war 
zones to the Urals and beyond, many more thousands of factories and people 
failed to survive vacuation efforts. Segbers makes a major contribution by 
carefully defining the innovations inwartime administration and balancing them 
against the inheritance of war communism and later modes of economic 
administration. He concludes that the creative improvisations of 1941-44 were 
the apogee of prior practice. Their legacy was mixed, however. New geographical 
areas of the Soviet Union and industries were opened to development after the 
war, but the relatively decentralized and flexible institutions ofthe war years 
quickly gave way to an ossified administrative command structure that dragged the 
economy into its present morass. Segbers's book reminds us of the very high 
quality of German contributions to late Imperial Russian and Soviet history, a fact 
all too often ignored among English-speaking academics. 
Despite these pathbreaking works, the field cries out for synthesis a well as 
new research, for harmonizing the roles of the leading actors (not just Stalin) and 
social movements, politics and society, ideas and action, and so on. We need a 
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complete map of the social terrain and many more studies of the politics of 
discrete areas of institutional life. The late Robert McNeal bravely attempted such 
a synthesis inhis biography Stalin: Man and Ruler.34 McNeal provides a fresh and 
sober reading of many traditional sources as well as the new scholarship and 
recently published memoirs. McNeal explicitly rejects attempts atpsychological 
explanations of Stalin's cruel and morbid personality, et he accepts such a 
personality asfact. He works throughout to relate the record of terror and Stalin's 
enormous political skills with larger social, cultural, and institutional f ctors. He 
puts it bluntly: "There is no point in trying to rehabilitate Stalin. The established 
impression that he slaughtered, tortured, imprisoned and oppressed on a grand 
scale is not in error. On the other hand it is impossible to understand this 
immensely gifted politician by attributing solely to him all the crimes and 
suffering ofhis era, or to conceive him simply as a monster and a mental case. 
From youth until death he was a fighter inwhat he, and many others, regarded as 
a just war."35 
McNeal agrees with Khrushchev's a sessment that Stalin was "incorruptible 
and irreconcilable inclass questions. It was one of his strongest qualities and he 
was greatly respected for it."36 The problem with McNeal's book comes when 
one looks for answers to some of the historiographical disputes concerning the 
Stalin era. On the question of the end of NEP, for example, McNeal maintains that 
there was an economic risis and that the idea of a new class war had social 
support particularly among younger Komsomol and Party activists who were 
motivated by genuine idealism. On collectivization, hesimilarly tries to reconcile 
the idea that initiatives sometimes came from the middle and lower levels of the 
power structure with the long-held view of Stalin as mastermind ofevery move. 
But this is biography and not solely a dry discussion of domestic policy. In a 
chapter entitled "Murder" (following chap. 8, "Builder"), McNeal takes up the 
violent nature of Stalin's personality and tries to pin down the dictator's 
responsibility. Basically, he argues that Stalin was "more or less responsible for 
the killing of a large number of the enemy" (p. 161). This refers to the author's 
vision of Stalin as a self-proclaimed combatant in the class struggle seen as the 
highest form of war. But in this chapter McNeal also takes up the issue of 
individual murders, specifically the deaths of Stalin's first wife Nedezhda 
Allilueva nd Sergei Kirov, Stalin's crony and possible rival. 
McNeal believes Allilueva's death in 1932 to have been suicide, and he rightly 
points out that subsequent events gave rise to a wide array of rumors about murder 
that spread in the Gulag camps, among emigres, and the like. The "morbid 
deterioration" ofStalin's relations with his comrades dated not from this tragedy 
but from the Kirov murder on December 1, 1934. Here again, McNeal finds that 
the best evidence for Stalin as murderer is only circumstantial. There is good 
evidence of conspiratorial activity in the security apparatus. On the other hand, 
McNeal argues that he evidence for Kirov having been the leader of an organized 
34 McNeal (n. 9 above). 
35 Ibid., p. 312. 
36 Ibid. 
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opposition to Stalin, or a "liberal alternative," is thin and suggests that such a 
conclusion is largely the product of the wishful thinking of such dissident (now 
establishment) historians a Roy Medvedev.37 Still, McNeal seems to find Stalin 
guilty because of Kirov's status as a potential rival. McNeal finds the pattern of 
Stalin's response to events at this time to be indicative of a new ruthless and 
paranoid attitude toward former comrades, and he uses Stalin's humiliation of 
Abel Enukidze as the example that closes out the chapter. McNeal presents and 
weighs the evidence on all sides of these issues, but in the end we are no closer 
to definitive answers to the historiographical riddles. 
Given Stalin's commitment to class war and his personal vindictiveness, what 
does McNeal make of the purges of the 1930s? He comes down on the side of 
traditional interpretations, namely, that he worst excesses of the 1936-38 period 
were orchestrated from the center; indeed, in the case of the Ezhovshchina, Stalin 
was "personally responsible for its design."38 But was Stalin mad, as Khrushchev 
implied in his "secret speech"? Again McNeal gives a judicious but evasive 
answer, noting that Stalin was remarkably effective inprojecting his "own reality" 
(possibly madness) onto large numbers of people. "And so terror, ationality and 
insanity appear as inextricably intertwined in Soviet society under Stalin as in his 
persona." McNeal downplays the record on center-periphery relations and the 
arguments ofArch Getty on the relatively autonomous workings of the purges away 
from the center,39 preferring to speak only of the Ezhovshchina-the well- 
publicized purges in which he finds Stalin's personal involvement paramount. So 
in a sense he sidesteps the issue of the purges in general as well as Getty's argument 
that, even if the Ezhovshchina is separate from the larger issue of purges, it too 
ought o be redefined as a radical response to real problems of bureaucratization. 
Here and on the subject of collectivization McNeal's analysis loses its focus. He 
wants to recognize the haphazard, unplanned nature of collectivization, for ex- 
ample, arguing that Stalin came late to a hard line on forcing the pace and attacking 
the Kulaks and that much can be blamed on other politburo members and provincial 
officials. Yet Taniuchi's work on the Ural-Siberian method implies amore clear-cut 
central government policy on forced local mobilizations, with the transformation 
of the local party organizations into more viable central government agents as a 
result. McNeal's cautious work is impressive, yet the field of Soviet history istoo 
fresh to permit closure on the Stalin problem. 
37 Here the debate focuses on the votes Stalin garnered at the seventeenth party congress for 
reelection to the central committee, a prerequisite for retaining his post as general secretary. In 
a recent interview in the leading Soviet academic historical journal, Medvedev and the first Soviet 
biographer of Stalin, General D. Volkogonov, both agreed heartily that Western scholarship had 
contributed little to an understanding ofStalin or of the Stalin problem. In fact, Medvedev went 
so far as to claim that Westerners had little business entering the debates. If such intolerant 
attitudes manifest themselves in the new leadership of Soviet academic institutions, the promise 
of a pluralist Soviet historiography of the revolutionary era will never be realized. "O Staline i 
Stalinizme: Beseda s D. A. Volkogonovym i R. D. Medvedevym," Istoriia SSSR 3 (1989): 
89-108. 
38 McNeal, p. 200. 
39 J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 
1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1985). 
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Exciting vistas have opened in Soviet history, and the field now has an 
unprecedented opportunity o further its agendas. The opening of the state and 
many regional archives (although the Party archives remain closed to foreign 
researchers); a new degree of cooperation from Soviet libraries; the outpouring of
documentary and memoir publications in the USSR; the existence there of a 
trained cadre of brilliant intellectuals formerly working in the underground but 
now able to collect materials, oral histories, documents, and the like; the 
formation fnew organizations ofSoviet historians ready and able to engage in 
dialogue; and the numerous new possibilities for exchange and collaboration with 
established Soviet historians and archivists and their supporting institutions-all 
point he way toward the further development ofthe field. Still, one must be wary 
of the pitfalls. Among these are the use of stale categories, periodizations, and 
problematics ( ometimes taken over from the most mainstream traditions of 
Soviet scholarship); failure to decode the language of Soviet sources; a too narrow 
definition fwhat is "Soviet" that limits the field of inquiry to the 1920s or 1930s 
as if all history began in 1921 or 1929; rejection of the relevance of the rich 
historiography of the decades leading to 1917; and the parochialism of Soviet- 
centeredness that denies any comparative dimension. Recent challenges to the 
imperial nature of the USSR should also spur a reconsideration of the construction 
of Russian and Soviet self and national identity. Itis clear that he imperial project 
of 1918-24 was at every juncture related to the construction f state, society, and 
party. It was Stalin, after all, who as head of the Peoples' Commissariat of 
Nationalities (Narkomnats) was largely responsible for the peculiar forms adopted 
for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This solution may be viewed as an 
early, but profound, post-Leninist watershed for the emerging Stalin governing 
bloc. It was Stalin, for example, who led the onslaught against Sultan Galiev and 
his brand of Muslim national communism. The Stalin-orchestrated show trial of 
Sultan Galiev in 1923 and the naming of his ideas as an "ism" -a different, 
deeply threatening, and intolerable variant of communism that could only be 
utterly destroyed by the centralized empire in Soviet guise-illustrate he kinds of 
connections that can inform and enrich our understanding of Soviet history.40 
Historians of twentieth-century Russia have worked wonders. May the field 
flourish. 
40 See Steven Blank's forthcoming book on Stalin and Narkomnats to be published by 
Northern Illinois University Press. 
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